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This paper presents the security analysis on the quantum stream cipher so called Yuen-2000
protocol (or αη scheme) against the fast correlation attack, the typical attack on stream ciphers.
Although a very simple experimental model of the quantum stream cipher without a random mapper
may be decrypted in the information theoretic sense by the fast correlation algorithm, it is not a
basic feature of Yuen 2000 protocol. In fact, we clarify that there exists a randomization scheme
which attains the perfect correlation immunity against such attacks under an approximation. And
in this scheme, the running key correlation from the second randomization that determines the
mapping patterns is dismissed also by quantum noise. In such a case, any fast correlation attack
does not work on the quantum stream cipher.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum stream cipher by quantum noise ran-
domization [1] so called Yuen 2000 protocol might be
an attractive new quantum cryptography which can re-
alize the ultra high speed data encryption. In fact, many
remarkable experiments have been demonstrated [2,3,4].
If this type of the quantum cryptography can provide
a pretty good security, it may be widely applied to the
real telecommunication networks. So the concrete secu-
rity analysis on the quantum stream cipher is one of the
most interesting subjects. In this paper, we will clar-
ify the security property of the quantum stream cipher
against the fast correlation attack, the most typical at-
tack on stream ciphers.
Since the quantum stream cipher by quantum noise
randomization has quite different from the conventional
one, we survey the basic structure of stream ciphers.
In the conventional cryptosystem, the stream cipher is
implemented by a pseudo random number generator:
PRNG with a short secret key and the XOR operation
with plaintext data bits. Here, let us describe these per-
formances based on an information theoretic approach.
The class of stream ciphers is called a non-random stream
cipher, when they have the following property:
H(Yn|KXn) = 0 (1)
where Xn, Yn are the n-long plaintext and ciphertext,
and K is the secret key shared by the legitimate users,
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respectively. Thus the plaintext and key uniquely de-
termine the ciphertext. On the other hand, the stream
cipher is called the randomized stream cipher when they
have the following property:
H(Yn|KXn) 6= 0. (2)
This means that ciphertexts are not unique even if the
plaintext and key are same. That is, the ciphertexts are
randomized. In the modern cryptography, this type of
cryptography is discussed by Schnorr, Diffie, Maurer, and
Cachin[5]. Maurer devised a randomized stream cipher
for which one can prove that Eve obtains no information
in Shannon’s sense about the plaintext with probability
close to 1. But his protocol works on the assumption that
memory capacity of attackers is limited[6]. This approach
provides an information theoretic notion of security un-
der a memory restriction. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
implement the practical system with a high speed pro-
cessing by it. However, it shows that the randomized
stream cipher may have a potential of the unbreakable
encryption. Now, Yuen-2000 protocol (Y-00) leads a new
type of randomized stream cipher so called ”a quantum
stream cipher” which can be implemented by the optical
communications [1]. A very simple experimental model
without a random mapper may be decrypted in the in-
formation theoretic sense by the fast correlation attacks.
But a purpose of the demonstration is to verify the quan-
tum noise effect, and it is not a basic feature. Y-00 may
have a specific security which cannot be attained by any
conventional symmetric key cipher. In this paper, we
will clarify a property of the security of Y-00 against the
correlation attacks and show a physical method to attain
the perfect correlation immunity against them.
2II. YUEN 2000 PROTOCOL
According to a quantum detection theory[7], we have
the following properties for the average error probability:
Pe(BP ) < Pe(BM), Pe(BP ) < Pe(MP ) (3)
where BP , BM , MP mean a binary pure state, a binary
mixed state, and a M -ary pure state, respectively. One
can apply the above principle of the quantum detection
theory to cryptography. Y-00 protocol is an example.
In Y-00 protocol, a PRNG with a shared key is used to
make a difference in the performances of quantum signal
detection. It means that if Eve does not know the key,
she has to detect M -ary quantum states, while Bob’s
detection procedure is the binary with the key. So Eve’s
detection suffers intrinsic errors. As a result, Eve has
to search for the data or the key based on her detection
results with an unavoidable quantum error.
Some ideas for the implementation are proposed as fol-
lows[2,3,4]. Alice and Bob share a secret key K. The key
length is |K| = 100 ∼ 1000 bits. The key is stretched by
a PRNG. The length of the running key is |K ′| ∼= 2|K|.
The output bit sequence of the PRNG is divided by each
logM bits, and each logM bits is regarded as the run-
ning key: KR = {1, 2, . . . ,Ki, . . . ,M}. The running key
corresponds to the basis {|αeiθi〉, |αei(θi+pi)〉}. That is,
when a running key appears, a coherent state basis cor-
responding to the running key is chosen. Then, the data
x ∈ X is transmitted by |αeiθi〉, or |αei(θi+pi)〉 of the ba-
sis. A mapping pattern that a mapping function from
running keys to bases of coherent states is given by the
next relation in the basic model of Y-00 by the phase
modulation:
L =
(
Ki
θi
)
=
(
1 2 3 . . . M
θ1 θ2 θ3 . . . θM
)
(4)
where the mapping Ki → θi means that Ki → {θi, θi +
π}, and π > θi+1 > θi > 0. However, to employ a random
mapping from running keys to bases of coherent states by
an additional LFSR with K2 has been recommended in
a real implementation[3]. Here, to simplify the explana-
tion we use Eq(4) as a mapping pattern. Quantum state
sequences emitted from the transmitter can be described
as follows:
|Ψ〉 = |α(KR, X)〉1|α(KR, X)〉2|α(KR, X)〉3 . . .
= |αi〉1|αj〉2|αk〉3 . . . (5)
where |αi〉 is one of 2M coherent states, αi = |α|eiθi , and
i, j, k ∈M = (1 ∼ 2M).
Alice and Bob will design the number of basis and sig-
nal distance between the neighboring states which satisfy
|〈αi|αi+1〉|2 ∼ 1, (6)
If Eve uses a heterodyne measurement as a sub quantum
optimum receiver, Eve’s ability can be evaluated by
Pe(i+1|i) = 1
2
− 1√
2π
∫ t0
0
exp(−t2/2)dt = 0.2 ∼ 0.5 (7)
where t0 =
pi|α|
2M for the phase modulation scheme, and
t0 =
|αmax−αmin|
4M for amplitude or intensity modulation
scheme. This corresponds to the error probability be-
tween neighboring states, and gives the degree of the
quantum noise effect for the quadrature amplitude α.
The output sequence of the transmitter in Y-00 is that
sequence of coherent states which convey the information
data or key. Even if the sequence of coherent states is a
deterministic sequence, Eve has to measure the sequence,
and error in the measured data is inevitable. Such an er-
ror provides a randomization by quantum noise at the
measurement. The measured data corresponds to the ci-
phertext, and the ciphertext is not unique even if the sig-
nal is the same one. This fact corresponds to Eq(2). De-
spite it, Bob can decrypt the measured data. Indeed the
decision making of legitimate users have no error or few
errors because of the measurement with the key, which
corresponds to no encryption. Thus a crucial point of
Y-00 is to realize the encryption by the unavoidable er-
ror of Eve. So it is clear that Y-00 is an encryption by
quantum noise.
Here we denote the necessities for the evaluation of
the security of Y-00. In the case of the ciphertext only
attacks, we need the following unicity distance:
nu = min{n : H(K|Yn) = 0} ∼ ∞ (8)
In the case of the known or chosen plaintext attacks,
the security can be evaluated by the following unicity
distance:
nGu = min{n : H(K|YnXn) = 0} (9)
This property is a main subject for the security analysis
of Y-00. There is no general theory on this problem, but
we discuss the feature on the specific attacks.
III. CONCRETE MODEL OF ATTACK
First let us discuss a role of the no cloning property
in attacks on Y-00. If Eve can make many copies of
the output state signals by a cloning procedure, she can
try the brute force attack on copies of the signals by
the receivers with possible keys. However, in Y-00, the
output of the transmitter is the sequence of 2M -ary co-
herent states as the non-orthogonal quantum states for
Eve. Consequently Eve cannot get the required copies
of the non-orthogonal quantum states according to the
no cloning theorem[8,9]. So Eve cannot launch a parallel
optical processing for the attack by all kind of key. Thus,
Eve cannot realize the parallel processing. But she can
make the equivalent situation to the parallel processing
on a long time series sequence of the coherent state sig-
nals. That is, Eve can try to measure many different
sequential segments of quantum states by the receivers
with many different keys. So she can try to decrypt Y-
00 along the time axis by ciphertext only attacks with
a statistical analysis. However, if the trial number is
3∼ 2|K|, Eve will spend the intractable time in the real
world even if she has the unlimited computation power.
This is one of the quantum advantages against the brute
force attack. In addition, a quantum unambiguous dis-
crimination attack also does not work[4].
Consequently, the most important attack is a post
measurement procedure which requires a sequential pro-
cessing on the measurement results along the time axis
by a single quantum optimum receiver to discriminate
2M coherent states. In schemes to get the serial data
by the single receiver, a quantum noise effect is also un-
avoidable. So Eve cannot get the exact data from her
measurement without the key. This fact realizes a ran-
domized stream cipher as Eq(2). However, Eve can apply
the correlation attacks based on the post measurement
procedure, which are the efficient known plaintext at-
tacks on stream ciphers [10-13]. Here, we will show a
security analysis against the correlation attack based on
the quantum individual measurement.
Let us survey the structure of the transmitter of Y-00.
(i) The sequence of the output of the PRNG is the
sequence of 0 and 1.
(ii) The output sequence is divided by logM bits,
and each block is transformed into the number of
mod(M). These correspond to the running key se-
quence, and assign one basis from M basis sets.
(iii) One plaintext is sent by one running key of logM
bits.
Then, the situation of Eve is described as follows:
(i) Eve measures each slot by the heterodyne receiver.
(ii) When Eve knows the plaintext, the measurement
results are regarded as the running key sequence.
Then the measurement results of one slot corre-
spond to logM bits of the output sequence from
the PRNG.
So we have to consider the following problem.
To determine the structure of the PRNG from the re-
ceived sequence with errors.
The brute force complexity of this problem is about
O(2|K|). Here, a fast correlation attack is applicable to
the above problem when the PRNG is a linear feedback
shift register: LFSR or its nonlinear combinations, only
when the secret part of the LFSR is the initial state. The
basic notion of the fast correlation attacks is to avoid the
factor 2|K| and derive algorithms with the complexity of
order 2η|K| with respect to η < 1. In the correlation
attack, the approach of viewing the problem as a decod-
ing problem is used. The linear complexity of the target
LFSR is |K| and the set of possible LFSR sequences is
C = 2|K|. For a fixed length N of the measured date, the
truncated sequences from C form a linear [N, |K|] block
code. The LFSR sequences is regarded as a code word
from an [N, |K|] linear block code, and the observed se-
quence is regarded as the output of a binary symmetric
channel: BSC which represents the randomness by the
non-linear combiner of many LFSRs. Let Pb be an error
probability or a crossover probability in the BSC. Due
to the correlation between the input and output of the
channel (BSC), attackers can search for the initial state
of the LFSR by the maximum likelihood decoding proce-
dure. In [11], it is claimed that a fast correlation attack
may succeed if N > n0, where n0 is the critical length
n0 =
|K|
C
(10)
where C = 1−H(Pb) is the channel capacity of the BSC
in the fast correlation attack model, and where H(Pb) =
−Pb logPb − (1 − Pb) log(1 − Pb). As an example, the
complexity of fast correlation attacks is given [11]
F ∼ O(( 1
2ǫ
)t−1 × 2|K|(1−
|K|
n0
)
) (11)
where t is a number of tap of the LFSR, and ǫ = 1/2 −
Pb. To break the system the attacker needs to observe a
segment of length N , where
N ∼ O(( 1
2ǫ
)t−1) > n0 (12)
In the case of the current stream ciphers, when ǫ >∼ 0.05,
the complexity and the required number of the obser-
vation may be efficiently reduced according to several
simulations[10-13].
Let us turn to Y-00. The observations of Eve in Y-
00 scheme suffer errors by real noises in the quantum
measurement process. When the measurement process
is regarded as the channel model with quantum noises,
the fast correlation attack against the LFSR as the driver
of the M -ary modulator in Y-00 is applicable, when the
tap state of the LFSR is opened. We give, here, a simple
example. The error in Eve’s phase measurement on a
very simple model of Y-00 is described by
θi → θm = θi±e, {e = 0, 1, 2} (13)
where θm is the measurement data when θi is true. If the
mapping pattern is Eq(4) which is a deterministic map-
ping, the bit error per each logM bits occurs mainly in
the last 3 bits of logM bits. In such a case, if the length
of the known plaintext is nearly |K| bits, Eve cannot de-
termine the key even if she has an unlimited power of
computer. So, she has to try ciphertext only attacks as
the brute force attack on the remained keys along the
time axis of the sequences because Eve cannot proceed
a parallel processing according to the no cloning prop-
erty. Consequently it takes intractable time to try the
brute force attack. This fact is one of quantum advan-
tages. However, it seems to qualify if the length of the
known plaintext is sufficiently long. That is, Eve may
decrypt Y-00 by using a correlation between each |K|
bits block(linear complexity of LFSR) in the measured
sequence and a set of LFSR of the number 2λ|K|, λ < 1.
4The correlation comes from the error free bits in the serial
segments of logM bits.
On the other hand, when we employ a random map-
ping from the running keys to bases of coherent states
by keyed randomization[3,14], the position of the error
bits will be diffused. An example of the concrete random
mapping method is given by us[15], which improves the
security feature against the fast correlation attacks. So,
even if Eve can get long known plaintext (N >> n0),
a very simple model of Y-00 with a random mapping
technique is secure against the fast correlation attack in
the sense of the computational complexity, because the
computational complexity of the fast correlation attacks,
which are known at present, is still exponential for a small
ǫ.
Thus, despite that we employ the simple LFSR as
the driver to the M -ary modulator, the security of Y-
00 against the known plaintext attack is sufficiently pro-
tected in the practical sense by quantum noise effects. If
we employ a non-linear LFSR by a non-linear combiner
(or multiplexed sequence generator) as the running key
generator in Y-00, the required length of the observed
sequence for the fast correlation attack on the non-linear
LFSR itself may be an exponential number even if the
system is noiseless. In this case, the running key se-
quence of Y-00 corresponds to the output sequence of
the channel model of the fast correlation attack. The
real observation sequence is the output of the cascaded
channels consisting of the channel of the fast correlation
attack and the channel of the quantum measurement.
Thus, Y-00 is always more secure than the conventional
stream cipher owing to the quantum noise effect and the
no cloning property as concluded in the references [1,3,4].
IV. CORRELATION IMMUNITY
In practice, there are many technical limits to give the
appropriate quantum noise effects which guarantee the
security. In the attacks based on heterodyne receiver[1,4],
the quantum noise is independent of the signal power
and the effect is not so large when the signal energy is
large. See Eq(13). So some mapping mechanisms so
called ”mapper” are necessary for practical applications
of Y-00.
A basic idea of the error enhancement techniques for
a provable security has been described in the reference
[1] so called the deliberate signal randomization (DSR)
which is a method without a shared key. Besides, the er-
ror performance of Bob is degraded, so one will need an
appropriate design. Let us introduce keyed randomiza-
tion[14] as mentioned in the previous section. This is a
randomization by an additional LFSR with an additional
shared key. This randomization has such an advantage
that it does not affect the error performance of Bob’s re-
ceiver. Although it seems, in general, not to be essential
for the ultimate security, however, here we show that the
keyed randomization gives a method to attain the perfect
correlation immunity against the fast correlation attacks
under the assumption of no quantum state to quantum
state correlation being exploited by Eve.
Let us denote here again that the region of the phase
error by the quantum noise is given only by Eq(13), which
is a small effect. Our aim is to enhance this effect by the
keyed randomization. One of the roles of the randomiza-
tion is to make error positions in bit sequences from the
LFSR uniform by the effect of the quantum noise even
if the phase error by the quantum noise is small. How-
ever, it is not sufficient for our purpose. In order that
the additional keyed randomization gives a further effect
on the system, there exists a condition. That is, keys of
both the driver and the additional randomization should
be hidden by quantum noise effects. The reason will be
explained later.
We will show a method which can attain the perfect
correlation immunity. We prepare an additional LFSR
which will be used to chose a mapping pattern from many
mapping patterns L1,L2,L3, . . .. However, each mapping
pattern of the set {Li} is designed as follows:
L1 =
(
Ki
θi
)
=
(
1 2 3 . . . M
θ1 θ2 θ3 . . . θM
)
L2 =
(
2 3 . . . M 1
θ1 + δ θ2 + δ . . . θM−1 + δ θM + δ
)
L3 =
(
3 4 . . . 1 2
θ1 + 2δ θ2 + 2δ . . . θM−1 + 2δ θM + 2δ
)
...
LM =
(
M . . . M − 1
θ1 + (M − 1)δ . . . θM + (M − 1)δ
)
(14)
where δ = |θi+1−θi|/M . The crucial point of this method
is the shift permutation in the mapping and the degree of
δ. A mapping pattern is chosen by the random sequence
of logM bits from the additional second LFSR. After the
selection of the mapping pattern, the first LFSR assigns
which basis should be used to transmit the information
bit. Since the second LFSR is also shared between Alice
and Bob, the error performance of Bob is not degraded.
However, Eve has to discriminate M ×M states which
have the phase difference δ. The quantum noise in the
heterodyne receiver affects several states close to the true
phase. That is, the standard deviation of the phase mea-
surement is
σ = ∆θm > 2Mδ = 2|θi+1 − θi| (15)
Hence the running keys of the first LFSR and the sec-
ond LFSR are completely hidden by the quantum noise.
This fact is important because the running key correla-
tion from the second LFSR that determines the mapping
patterns is dismissed. As a result, it becomes a basis in-
dependence. That is, all logM bits per signal slot suffer
the error by the quantum noise.
We here employ a wedge approximation for the quan-
tum noise effect on the phase space in order to evalu-
ate the quantum noise effect. The wedge approximation
5means the following model: Let us cut a circle on the
phase space like a wedge based on the center of the circle,
θi+1 and θi on the circle. If the phase difference |θi+1−θi|
is sufficiently small, the probability distribution of noise
can be regarded as uniform within the standard deviation
and zero outside. Under this approximation, the symbol
error is
Pe = 1− 1
M
, (16)
then the bit error is
Pb =
1
2
(1− 1
M
) (17)
Thus, in Eq(11) and Eq(12), ǫ is 12M ∼ 0,M >> 1.
It leads the fact that the required observation number
becomes intractable. So the correlation immunity is at-
tained. This results is valid for any fast correlation attack
under the approximation that Eve looks at each quantum
state independently of the others as in the standard corre-
lation attacks, which does not take into account quantum
state to quantum state basis correlation.
V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the security against the fast correla-
tion attack on the quantum stream cipher by Yuen 2000
protocol, and we have proposed a scheme which attains
the perfect correlation immunity under an approxima-
tion.
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